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PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF SUCCESSION:
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Karl W. Cavanaugh
When a person dies, there should be a winding up of affairs in
which the assets owned are identified and gathered together, debts and
taxes paid, and the decedent's property delivered to properly identified
successors. Such is the function of probate proceedings in the law. In
Louisiana law, a discussion of creditors' rights in the succession must
begin with the concept of universal succession which our law implements.
UNIVERSAL SUCCESSION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Universal succession is the distinctive feature of Louisiana probate
law.' On the death of the ancestor, the heirs immediately succeed to
the entire patrimony of the decedent. 2 The maxim "le mort saisit le
vif" is a shorthand exposition of the entire doctrine of universal suc-
cession.
Under universal succession, there is no interruption of ownership,
but the law may require an administration of the ancestor's patrimony
for the benefit of creditors before the heirs are judicially placed in
possession and permitted to exercise the ordinary attributes of owner-
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. La. Civ. Code art. 871 provides: "Succession is the transmission of the estate
of the deceased to his successors. The successors thus have the right to take possession
of the estate of the deceased after complying with the applicable provisions of law." The
official comment to the revised article points out: "Since the property is transmitted
immediately upon death to the proper successors, it follows that they have a right to
possession after complying with appropriate procedural requisites."
La. Civ. Code art. 872 provides:
The estate of a deceased means the property, rights, and obligations that a
person leaves after his death, whether the property exceeds the charges or the
charges exceed the property, or whether he has only left charges without any
property. The estate includes not only the rights and obligations of the deceased
as they exist at the time of death, but all that has accrued thereto since death,
and the new charges to which it becomes subject.
In other words, the estate consists of the entire patrimony of the decedent, and it is
transmitted immediately upon death to successors.
2. La. Civ. Code arts. 871, 872.
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ship.3 In many instances, however, the heirs may be placed into pos-
session by an unconditional acceptance of the succession 4 without any
sort of administration.' In this respect, Louisiana law diverges from
common law jurisdictions where an administration for the benefit of
creditors is typical. 6 The Louisiana procedures achieve substantial econ-
omies in expenses, time, and judicial energy. 7 Historically, these econ-
omies have been possible because universal successions protect creditors.
The heirs may obtain possession of the ancestor's property with an
unconditional acceptance (in lieu of an administration); by an uncon-
ditional acceptance, the heirs became personally liable to creditors for
the decedent's debts.'
The consequences of an unconditional acceptance can be disastrous
if the decedent is heavily indebted or insolvent. Consequently, Louisiana
law always has allowed two other options: the heirs may renounce the
succession entirely9 or accept "with benefit of inventory" 10 and avoid
personal liability for the decedent's debts. This phrase "with benefit of
inventory" is a term of legal art which is subject to a misunderstanding
which may be illustrated by the following scenario.
3. The "applicable provisions of law" mentioned in La. Civ. Code art. 871 are for
the most part in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. in
Book 6, Title 3. See also Succession of Stauffer, 119 La. 66, 69, 43 So. 928, 929 (1907):
By the fiction of the law, "le mort saisit le vif," the heir is seised of right,
but not in fact, until he accepts the succession and is sent into or takes possession
according to law. As long as the property is under administration it remains
in the custody of the law, and the rights of heirs and legatees are in abeyance
until the administration is closed.
4. Over the years the shopworn phrase "purely, simply, and unconditionally" has
become the standard language in petitions for possession to describe this sort of acceptance.
5. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3001-3035.
6. 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors and Administrators § 8 (1967) states, "Theoretically,
administration on a decedent's estate is necessary in all cases, because title to the personality
does not descend to the next of kin . I..." instead, personal property descends to the
personal representative, i.e., the executor or administrator. The source notes certain
exceptions. The same source, in § 9 states, "Each creditor has the right to compel
administration and, through administration, to subject the debtor's estate, real and per-
sonal, to the payment of debts against the estate." See also Haskell, Preface to Wills,
Trusts and Administration 164 (1987). The Model Probate Code, adopted in some states,
makes a theoretical change from classic common law by having all property, real or
personal, descend to the successors, but such property is subject to the administration of
the decedent's estate for the payment of creditors.
7. See Sarpy, Probate Economy in Louisiana, 16 La. B.J. 205 (1968) and Sarpy,
Probate Economy and Celerity in Louisiana, 34 La. L. Rev. 523 (1974).
8. La. Civ. Code art. 1423.
9. La. Civ. Code arts. 1014-1031.
10. La. Civ. Code arts. 1032-1068. See also La. Civ. Code art. 337 (formerly La.
Civ. Code art. 352 (1870)).
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Assume that decedent discovered a man dating his estranged wife
and thereupon shot and killed him. Decedent then committed suicide
and his estranged wife had herself placed in possession as universal
legatee based on an unconditional acceptance of the succession. The
victim's survivors then sue decedent's widow for the wrongful death of
their father. The suit asserts no wrongful act by decedent's widow;
rather it merely asserts her personal liability, due to her unconditional
acceptance of the succession, for the wrongful acts of decedent. The
widow will argue vehemently that because there was a detailed descriptive
list in the succession proceedings," she accepted "with benefit of in-
ventory" and thus has no personal liability for decedent's death. The
argument is utterly unsound and the widow loses. 12
Louisiana Civil Code article 1423 states the basic rule that heirs,
by accepting a succession without benefit of inventory, "contract the
obligation to discharge all the debts of such succession," regardless of
the amount and even if the debts "far exceed the value of the effects
composing it."'" Universal legatees incur the same obligation to pay the
debts as the universal heir, and this obligation results in personal lia-
bility.' 4 The creditor may sue the accepting heir or legatee directly for
the debt. 15 The filing of an inventory or detailed descriptive list, as such,
is not an acceptance "with benefit of inventory." Such has been the
law of Louisiana for many years.
LouIA.NA REVISED STATUTES 9:1421
By 1986 La. Acts No. 602, the legislature adopted Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:1421 which declares that:
11. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3136 permits a detailed descriptive list to be used instead
of a formal inventory by a notary.
12. But see La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987) adopted by 1986 La. Acts No. 602. The
facts of the hypothetical are similar to an actual case in which the author was counsel.
The trial court held that since the widow "accepted" before the wrongful death suit was
filed, the "debt" did not then exist and she had no personal liability. The court of appeal
reversed, but unfortunately the opinion is unpublished and may not be cited. There is
no doubt, however, that accepting heirs or universal legatees are liable for the delictual
obligations of a decedent. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 427 comment (b); Ruiz v. Clancy,
182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935); Parish v. Minvielle, 217 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969).
13. La. Civ. Code art. 1423. See also Guedry Fin. Co. v. Sanderson, 348 So. 2d
119 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Butler v. Butler, 212 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 252 La. 877, 214 So. 2d 548 (1968); Cattle Farms, Inc. v. Abercrombie, 211 So.
2d 354 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Guillory v. Desormeaux, 166 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964); Robinson v. Dunson, 65 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
14. La. Civ. Code arts. 1424, 1426. See Succession of Hoffman, 126 So. 2d 774
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). If there are several heirs, their liability, while personal, is not
solidary. La. Civ. Code art. 1425.
15. La. Civ. Code art. 1426. See also Smith v. Huckaby, 141 So. 2d 72 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1962); Succession of Hoffman, 126 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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Notwithstanding any provision in the law to the contrary,
including but not limited to Civil Code Articles 976 through
1013 and Civil Code Articles 1415 through 1466, every successor
is presumed and is deemed to have accepted a succession under
benefit of inventory even though the acceptance is unconditional,
and where an inventory or descriptive list has been executed.
In such case, every heir or legatee, whether particular or under
universal title, shall not in any manner become personally liable
for any debt or obligation of the decedent or his estate, except
to the extent and value or amount of his inheritance; however,
any such heir or legatee may, in the petition for possession or
by a separate instrument in writing, personally obligate himself
for any or all of such debts or obligations.1 6
If this amendment is interpreted to mean that the heirs have no personal
liability for the decedent's debts whenever there is a detailed descriptive
list in the succession proceedings, even if the heirs are put into possession
without an administration-and that appears to be the intent-it will
cause a revolution in the handling of creditors' claims against the suc-
cession and is likely to lead creditors to demand security or an
administration 17 in every succession. In that event, Louisiana will lose
the probate economy it has previously enjoyed.
There seems to be a fundamental misapprehension about the pro-
visions of the Louisiana Civil Code and the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure. The phrase "with benefit of inventory" signals that there
will be an administration of the succession. Louisiana Civil Code article
1032 uses this legal shorthand to describe the conditions under which
the heir avoids personal liability for the decedent's debts and receives
only the residuum after creditors are paid.1 8 In fact, the formal steps
to be followed are contained in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,
Book 6, Title 3, which deals with administration of successions, rather
than in the Louisiana Civil Code. It is the administrationlof the suc-
cession and the payment of creditors in that administration which relieves
the heirs of personal liability for the decedent's debts, not the ritual
incantation that they accept "with benefit of inventory". 9
The fact that it is the administration of the succession and the
payment of creditors in that administration which relieves the heirs of
16. La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987). Perhaps coincidentally, this Act was adopted when
the unreported opinion mentioned in note 12 was pending in the court of appeal.
17. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3007-3008.
18. La. Civ. Code art. 1032.
19. This statement appears to be true even for a minor who is "considered" to
accept a succession per La. Civ. Code art. 337 (formerly La. Civ. Code art. 352 (1870))
with benefit of inventory.
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personal liability is most readily seen in cases in which an administration
is started, but the heirs are placed into possession without a complete
administration. 20 An heir is entitled to be sent into possession "with
benefit of inventory" only after the succession has been fully admin-
istered. As explained in Kelly v. Kelly:
The benefit of inventory, therefore, does not give an heir the
right to take possession, unconditionally, or as owner, of any
of the property of the succession, without making himself liable
personally for the debts or obligations of the succession. When
the succession is accepted under benefit of inventory, the estate
must be administered and liquidated-even though the benefi-
ciary heir himself should be the administrator for the benefit
of the creditors primarily; the rights of the beneficiary heir being
only residuary. 21
Therefore, any other putting into possession, including possession with
incomplete administration, is an unconditional acceptance which leaves
the heir personally liable for the decedent's debts. 22
It is useful to consider the position of a minor heir. Under Louisiana
Civil Code article 337, a minor does not have to make a formal ac-
ceptance of a succession, but "shall be considered" to accept it with
benefit of inventory. 23 Does this mean that a minor cannot be liable
for the decedent's debts if there is no administration of the succession?
20. See, e.g. Pacific Land Title Corp. v. Executive Office Centers, Inc., 420 So. 2d
1021 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982). La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3362 and 3372 expressly authorize
the heirs to abort an administration and be placed in possession, but it must be by an
unconditional acceptance. The jurisprudence allows a surviving spouse to abort an ad-
ministration and be sent into possession of the community, as owner of one half and as
usufructuary of the other half. See Succession of Pyle, 434 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1983); Succession of Caffarel, 378 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied,
381 So. 2d 509 (1980). The problems created by these decisions are discussed in Cavanaugh,
Problems in the Law of Succession: Succession Representatives, Surviving Spouses, and
Usufructuaries, 47 La. L. Rev. 21 (1986).
21. 198 La. 338, 354, 3 So. 2d 641, 646 (1941).
22. Pacific Land Title Corp. v. Executive Office Centers, Inc., 420 So. 2d 1021,
1024 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982): "If the succession was fully administered the heir was
entitled to possession under benefit of inventory, otherwise, the heir was entitled to
possession only on an 'unconditional acceptance."' The court held the succession was not
fully administered and the heir was liable for the decedent's debts. See also Bradley v.
Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 359 So. 2d 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), for a consistent
decision regarding the personal liability of a person who was a minor at the time of
death of the decedent but who remained in possession of succession assets, without judicial
proceedings, after reaching majority.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 337. The legislation has a tangled history. Under La. Civ.
Code art. 63 (1808) and La. Civ. Code art. 346 (1825), a minor could accept only with
benefit of inventory. The same idea was carried forward as La. Civ. Code art. 352 (1870).
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Bradley v. Union National Life Insurance Company2 presented that
question, for the minor heir took possession without judicial proceedings
for the succession. After the heir attained majority, she continued to
possess the succession assets. Her continued possession was held to be
a tacit acceptance which rendered her personally liable to the decedent's
creditors.
Two old cases, Hall v. Parks5 and Parks v. Patten,2 appear to say
that there must be an administration whenever there is a minor heir,
as they accept with benefit of inventory. If the language in Louisiana
Civil Code article 337 indicating that a minor "shall be considered" an
acceptance with benefit of inventory, does not relieve the minor heir of
personal liability when there is no administration of the succession, can
the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 indicating that every
successor "is presumed and is deemed" to accept with benefit of in-
ventory relieve an heir of personal liability if there is no administration
of the succession? 27
The essential irrelevance of the filing of an inventory or detailed
descriptive list28 to the discharging of the heirs from personal liability
for the decedent's debts is obvious. What if the inventory is inaccurate
and a debt is omitted so that the succession is closed with a judgment
of possession? Under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3393,
it may be possible to reopen the succession to deal with the creditor's
claim. 29 In any event, if the succession was fully administered, the heirs
24. 359 So. 2d 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
25. 9 Rob. 138 (La. 1844).
26. 9 Rob. 167 (La. 1844).
27. The result of the cases cited in the text appears to be that a minor is relieved
of liability only if there is an administration. La. Code Civ. P. art. 732 and the tutorship
articles, La. Code Civ. P. arts. 4261-4275, clearly contemplate that a minor's obligations
may be enforced, although an unemancipated minor has no procedural capacity to stand
in judgment.
28. Such a document is, of course, a practical necessity for an administration, but
it has no logical relationship to relief of the heirs from personal liability.
29. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3393. There is substantial doubt whether the succession
can be so reopened in these circumstances. The statute permits a reopening to deal with
omitted assets, "or for any other proper cause." See Succession of Lasseigne, 488 So. 2d
1303 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 494 So. 2d 327 (1986); In Re Richardson's Estate,
214 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 253 La. 66, 216 So. 2d 309 (1968).
Both cases refused to reopen the succession, but both suggested reopening is possible to
deal with a creditor's claim. See also Succession of Anderson, 323 So. 2d 827 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1975), in which the court pretermitted consideration of La. Civ. Code art. 3393
and ordered the trial court to allow the alleged creditor to sue to annul the judgment
of possession for fraud and ill practices under La. Civ. Code art. 2004. There has been
considerable reluctance on the part of courts to reopen successions for reasons other than
omitted assets. It would be desirable to amend the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
to authorize expressly reopening the succession to deal with creditors' claims.
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will have no personal liability, but the property of the former succession
will still be liable for the debt.30 Death does not cancel debt; cancellation
occurs only by prescription.3 On the other hand, if the heirs were placed
into possession before the succession was fully administered, they will
be personally liable for the debt.32
Since under universal succession the heirs succeed to the entire
patrimony of the deceased, the patrimony may well include obligations
other than "debts" which require payment in money.3 A few types of
"debts" usually are not reflected on an inventory or detailed descriptive
list because they are not present obligations to pay money. Contingent
liabilities (such as the potential and secondary liability of the indorser
of a negotiable note) rarely appear, and warranty obligations never
appear in succession documents. Nevertheless, the heirs who make an
unconditional acceptance are bound by the warranty obligations of the
decedent. 34 Title examiners regularly rely on such estoppel by deed cases.
If the succession is fully administered before the heirs are placed in
possession, they are not bound by the decedent's warranties even though
these warranties are never disclosed in the inventory or detailed descrip-
tive list."
30. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983). Where the heirs accept with benefit
of inventory and the succession is administered so that creditors are paid, the proceeding
has a strong analogy to a bankruptcy proceeding. Both reflect the basic idea of requiring
all claims against certain assets to be asserted in a single proceeding.
31. Note that Louisiana, unlike many states, does not have a bar claim statute under
which there is a published notice of a date after which no claim can be asserted against
a succession.
32. Pacific Land Title Corp. v. Executive Office Centers, Inc., 420 So. 2d 1021 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1982). The old cases collected in official comment (c) to La. Code Civ.
P. art. 3001 illustrate that the omitted creditor's remedy is to sue the heirs for their virile
share of the debt.
33. All heritable obligations are transmitted to the heirs; purely personal obligations
are not. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1765-1766 (former La. Civ. Code arts. 1997-2009 (1870))
for the distinction between heritable and purely personal obligations.
34. Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339, 123 So. 2d 79 (1960); Louisiana Canal Co. v.
Leger, 237 La. 936, 112 So. 2d 667 (1959); Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932, 28 So. 2d
665 (1946); White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So. 2d 433 (1942); Jackson v. United Gas
Pub. Serv. Co., 196 La. 1, 1.98 So. 633 (1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 686, 61 S. Ct. 63
(1940); Mims v. Sample, 191 La. 677, 186 So. 66 (1938); James Harvey Ramsey Estate,
Inc. v. Pace, 467 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Pacific Land Title Corp. v.
Executive Office Centers, Inc., 420 So. 2d 1021 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982); Butler v. Butler,
212 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 252 La. 877, 214 So. 2d 548 (1968);
Cattle Farms, Inc. v. Abercrombie, 211 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). Every sale
of immovable property under standard warranties includes warranty of title. The cited
cases show the importance of these heritable obligations.
35. This conclusion is the converse of the propositions established by the cases cited
in the previous note. Compare Little v. Barbe, 195 La. 1071, 198 So. 368 (1940), which
shows that where the heir never accepts the ancestor's succession, the heir is not bound
by the ancestor's warranties.
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With this background, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 appears to
attempt a radical change in Louisiana law which is quite in conflict
with the doctrine of universal succession. Apparently, the legislature
intended to overrule such cases as Kelly v. Kelly 6 and Pacific Land
Title Corp. v. Executive Office Centers, Inc." so that the accepting heirs
who are placed in possession without an administration of the succession
have, no liability for the decedent's debts if a detailed descriptive list
or inventory is filed in the succession proceedings. Whether the attempt
was successful is not clear. Since the meaning of "with benefit of
inventory" has been, heretofore, that the heirs consent to an admin-
istration of the succession, an administration may still be required to
achieve the limited liability of the heirs.3" Assuming that the statute
relieves heirs of personal liability even if there is no administration,
some creditor left without a remedy by this interpretation may persuade
the courts that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 is unconstitutional
under the doctrine of substantive due process.39 Under this view of the
statute, title examiners will have to note that heirs will not be liable
on the warranties owed by the decedent.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 should inspire caution in attorneys.
Until there is an authoritative interpretation of the statute by the Louis-
iana Supreme Court, prudent attorneys representing heirs should not
assume that heirs can be relieved of personal liability for the decedent's
debts, without an administration of the succession, merely by filing a
detailed descriptive list or inventory. On the other hand, prudent at-
torneys representing creditors should assume that heirs can be relieved
of personal liability for the decedent's debts, without an administration
of the succession, merely by filing a detailed descriptive list or inventory,
and act accordingly.
In any succession pursued to a judgment of possession, there will
be a detailed descriptive list or inventory filed.4 If Louisiana Revised
36. 198 La. 338, 3 So. 2d 641 (1941).
37. 420 So. 2d 1021 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).
38. The additional language of La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987) reflects that the legislature
intended limited liability of the heirs any time a detailed descriptive list is filed. On the
other hand, to comply with the statute, counsel for the heirs has to watch his language
in the petition for possession; the traditional language in such documents imports acceptance
of personal liability by the heirs. See, e.g., McMahon & Rubin, La. Code Civ. P., vol.
11, form 802(a).
39. Consider the case in which the heirs file a detailed descriptive list, immediately
are sent into possession without an administration, and then promptly sell the assets
received to a third party in good faith. It appears that a creditor of the decedent would
have no remedy unless he can follow the assets into the hands of a third party. See La.
R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983).
40. The heirs may not be placed into possession until inheritance taxes are paid or
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Statutes 9:1421 is held to mean the heirs can be relieved of personal
liability merely by filing this document in the succession proceedings-
and that appears to be the intent-then the basic Louisiana law on the
liability of heirs for debts of the decedent has been changed radically
so that such liability will exist only in the case of a tacit acceptance of
the succession without judicial proceedings. 4' This result might give
vitality to the privileges adopted when the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure abolished the ancient action for separation of patrimony.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5011 to 9:5016 actually provide for
three separate privileges. 42 One privilege is in favor of creditors of the
deceased and another in favor of a particular legatee. 43 The third privilege
the Department of Revenue has indicated that no such taxes are due. La. R.S. 47:2407
to 2413 (1952 & Supp. 1987); La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2951-2954. To get approval on the
taxes owed or not owed, it is necessary to furnish a copy of the detailed descriptive list
or inventory. Such a document is also required by La. Code Civ. P. art. 3001 to show
that the succession is relatively free from debt.
41. See La. Civ. Code arts. 988 and 990 on tacit acceptance. There are numerous
cases on the subject. A suit to partition or to be declared owner of a succession asset
constitutes tacit acceptance. Smith v. Smith, 230 La. 509, 89 So. 2d 55 (1956); Mitcham
v. Mitcham, 186 La. 641, 173 So. 132 (1937). Likewise, exercise of dominion over a
succession asset, as by mortgaging or selling it, constitutes a tacit acceptance. Barnsdall
Oil Co. v. Appelgate, 218 La. 572, 50 So. 2d 197 (1950); Parish v. Minvielle, 217 So.
2d 684 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); Butler v. Butler, 212 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 252 La. 877, 214 So. 2d 548 (1968); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Naquin,
167 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 246 La. 884, 168 So. 2d 268 (1964).
Acts that go beyond conservatory measures, such as managing the property of the decedent,
drawing revenues from it, etc., constitute a tacit acceptance. Succession of Breeland, 383
So. 2d 423 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Bradley v. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 359 So. 2d
663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978). However, merely conservatory acts or payment of the
decedent's funeral expenses do not result in a tacit acceptance. Pelican Well Tool &
Supply Co. v. Sebastian, 212 La. 217, 31 So. 2d 745 (1947); McClelland v. Clay, 444
So. 2d 639 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
42. La. R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983).
43. La. R.S. 9:5011 (1983) provides:
A creditor of the succession of a deceased person has a privilege on all of
the property left by the deceased, if the heirs or legatees have accepted the
succession without an administration thereof. The creditor enjoys this privilege
whether his claim is demandable or not, and whether it is liquidated or not.
A particular legatee who has not received the delivery of his legacy has a
privilege on all of the property left by the deceased, if the residuary heirs or.
legatees have accepted the succession without an administration thereof.
The privileges provided by this section entitle the succession creditor to be
paid out of the proceeds of the judicial sale of the property left by the deceased,
and the particular legatee to compel the delivery of his legacy, with preference
over the creditors of the heirs or legatees.
Note that the privilege exists when the heirs accept the succession "without an admin-
istration thereof"; acceptance "with benefit of inventory" but without an administration
does not defeat the privilege. La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987) does not appear to alter this
statute.
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is in favor of creditors of the heirs, that is, not succession creditors.-
The key provision is Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5013 which provides:
A. The privilege provided by R.S. 9:5011 or R.S. 9:5012, for
a period of three months after the death of the deceased and
whether recorded or not, shall affect the movables owned by
the heirs or legatees at, but shall be subordinate to any mortgage
granted or other privilege existing thereon prior to, the time the
privilege to effect a separation of patrimony is sought to be
enforced.
B. If the succession creditor, particular legatee, or creditor of
the heir or legatee, as the case may be, files an affidavit of his
claim for recordation in the mortgage office of the parish where
immovable property is situated within three months of the death
of the deceased:
(1) The privileges provided by R.S. 9:5011 shall affect all
immovables left by the deceased, including those alienated by
the heirs or legatees; as provided by R.S. 9:5014; and
(2) The privilege provided by R.S. 9:5012 shall affect im-
movables not acquired through the succession and owned by the
heir or legatee at, but shall be subordinate to any mortgage
granted or other privilege existing thereon prior to, the time the
privilege to effect a separation of patrimony is sought to be
enforced.
This statute makes it clear that if the succession creditor acts promptly
and jumps through the proper procedural hoops, he can enforce his
claim against succession immovables even though the heirs alienate them.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5014 and 9:5015, the creditor must
file suit to enforce the privilege within three months from the rendition
of a judgment of possession in the succession proceeding. 4 With respect
44. La. R.S. 9:5012 (1983) provides:
A creditor of an heir or residuary legatee who has accepted the succession
of a deceased person without an administration thereof has a privilege on all
of the property owned by the heir or legatee which was not acquired through
the succession. The creditor enjoys this privilege whether his claim is demandable
or not, and whether it is liquidated or not.
The privilege provided by this section entitles the creditor of the heir or
residuary legatee to be paid out of the proceeds of the judicial sale of the
property affected thereby, with preference over the succession creditors.
The purpose of the former action for separation of patrimony was to prevent the assets
of the succession from being confounded with those of the heirs before creditors could
be paid. Washington v. Washington, 116 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959), amended
and aff'd, 241 La. 35, 127 So. 2d 491 (1961). The privileges created when the action for
separation of patrimony was abolished can achieve the same result.
45. La. R.S. 9:5014 to 9:5015 (1983). For this creditor's remedy to be of any value,
the creditor must receive notice of the death and the succession proceedings. Problems
relating to notice are discussed infra text accompanying notes 88-99.
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to succession creditors, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5013 appears to
give the succession. creditor a privilege which primes prior mortgages on
immovable property under Louisiana Civil Code article 3186, but remains
inferior to prior mortgages on movables. 46 There are no reported de-
cisions on the statutes which create privileges to effect a separation of
patrimony and, heretofore, they appear to have been used little in
practice. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 may lead to their more
frequent use in practice.
Actually, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3007 may provide
the unsecured creditor 47 a simpler remedy than the privileges just dis-
cussed 48 Under that article, a succession creditor may file a demand
for security in the succession proceeding within three months of the
rendition of a judgement of possession. If the heirs do not furnish the
security ordered, there must be an administration of the succession 49
These provisions clearly contemplate that the heirs (who are required
to give security) are personally liable to the creditor by *virtue of their
unconditional acceptance.10 What effect Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421
will have on this remedy is unknown at this time. It would be unfortunate
if the amendment deprives the creditors of such an effective remedy.
UNSECURED CREDITORS
At the time the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure was afdited,'
unsecured creditors generally held small claims. That is still true 'with
the important exception of funeral expenses and uninsured medial,
expenses. 5 Due to inflation, such claims can be substantial.12 Some
46. La. R.S. 9:5103 (1983), La. Civ. Code art. 3186.
47. Official comment (e) indicates that a partially secured creditor is also covered by
the article to the extent that he is unsecured. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3007 comment (e).
48. There appears to be no reason why the creditor cannot pursue both remedies.
49. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3008. If the creditor's claim is substantial, the heirs may
not be able to provide security. Commercial bonds are virtually unavailable for this
purpose (usually procurable only upon deposit with the bonding company of cash collateral
equal to the penal sum of the bond); thus the availability of unencumbered immovable
property may determine whether the heirs can give security. If the court refuses to order
security, that action is not appealable. Succession of Ciruti, 428 So. 2d 1013 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1983).
50. The official comments under La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3007 and 3008 refer back
to the official comments under La. Code Civ. P. art. 3001, where this assumption is
made express in comment (c).
51. Technically, both funeral expenses and medical expenses related to the last illness
are entitled to statutory privileges. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3191-3204. However, it is
useful for present purposes to treat all debts as unsecured if there is no consensual security
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creditors, such as utility companies, have reasonably effective self-
help remedies," but most creditors will need to take prompt action
of some sort to procure payment. What that action is depends on
whether the succession is opened, and whether the heirs institute
administration.
A. Succession Not Opened Judicially
If the succession is not opened judicially, unsecured creditors
usually present their invoices to the surviving spouse 4 or to such heirs
as the creditor knows. If payment is not forthcoming, the creditor
has legal remedies. If there has been a tacit acceptance," and that is
usually the result where no succession is opened judicially, the creditor
may sue the accepting heirs for the debt as they become personally
liable to him by their unconditional acceptance. 6 If the creditor acts
promptly, he may secure and enforce the privilege to achieve a sep-
aration of patrimony. 7 Act 963 of 19878 amended Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 3245 to permit the creditor to file a formal
proof claim with the clerk of court in the parish in which the decedent
given for it, since the only secured creditors for whom special provision is made by the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure are those holding mortgages or pledges.
52. The uninsured liability in tort from an automobile accident or workmen's com-
pensation, for instance, can also be a substantial claim, but these are not frequently
encountered. For example, see Parish v. Minvielle, 217 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969). Succession of Isgitt, 297 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), presented an interesting
problem. An alleged employee of the decedent filed suit against him during his lifetime
for workmen's compensation. There was apparently no insurance. After the decedent's
death, the alleged employee substituted the administratrix of decedent's succession into
the suit. The alleged employee also opposed the tableau of distribution in the succession
proceeding because it failed to list him as a creditor; at the time, the workmen's com-
pensation suit had not been brought to trial. The court of appeal fashioned a remedy
not provided for in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. It ordered the trial court to
suspend homologation of the tableau of distribution until the outcome of the workmen's
compensation suit was known.
53. If an heir or the surviving spouse remains on the premises of the deceased, the
power to cut off utility services is sufficient to extract payment. An interesting query is
whether payment of utility bills creates a tacit acceptance of the succession of the decedent.
54. A serious argument can be made that in any instance in which there was a regimi
of community property, the surviving spouse, rather than a succession representative, is
the person who has authority to pay debts. For an inquiry into this argument, see
Cavanaugh, Problems in the Law of Succession: Succession Representatives, Surviving
Spouses, and Usufructuaries, 47 La. L. Rev. 21, 30-33 (1986).
55. See La. Civ. Code arts. 988, 990.
56. Since a tacit acceptance cannot be "with benefit of inventory," such an acceptance
is necessarily an unconditional acceptance. The heir's liability is set by La. Civ. Code
art. 1423, and La. Civ. Code art. 1426 authorizes a direct suit against the heir for that
heir's virile share of the liability.
57. La. R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983).
58. 1987 La. Acts No. 963.
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was domiciled. By so filing a formal proof of claim, the creditor
suspends prescription until a judgment of possession is rendered. 9
B. Succession Opened Judicially Without Administration
Heretofore, it was clear that where the succession was opened ju-
dicially and the heirs were placed in possession without an administration,
the heirs had made an unconditional acceptance and were personally
liable for the decedent's debts. Thus, the creditor could sue them directly.
It is uncertain that such is still the law of Louisiana since Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:1421 declares that the acceptance is deemed to be
with "benefit of inventory" if an inventory or detailed descriptive list
is filed in the succession ° The unsecured creditor's only remedies may
be to take prompt action to preserve and enforce the privilege granted
by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5011 to 9:5016 or demand security
pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3007.61 In the
circumstances envisioned, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 may make
it wholly impossible for the creditor whose claim is not based on a
written document to collect by complying with Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:3721.62 Since there never was a succession representative or any ad-
ministration, the only option Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3721 leaves
59. The prescription on the debt itself is suspended; filing a proof of claim does not
affect the prescription on the privilege granted by La. R.S. 9:5011 (1987).
60. La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987).
61. La. R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983); La. Code Civ. P. art. 3007. As noted above,
La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987) may make this remedy unavailable, as the remedy assumes
personal liability of the accepting heirs.
62. This "dead man" statute provides:
Parol evidence shall not be received to prove any debt or liability of a deceased
person against his succession representative, heirs, or legatees when no suit to
enforce it has been bought against the deceased prior to his death, unless within
one year of the death the deceased:
(1) A suit to enforce the debt or liability is brought against the succession
representative, heirs, or legatees of the deceased;
(2) The debt or liability is acknowledged by the succession representative as
provided in Article 3242 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or by his placing it
on a tableau of distribution, or petitioning for authority to pay it;
(3) The claimant has opposed a\ petition for authority to pay debts, or a
tableau of distribution, filed by the succession representative on the ground that
it did not include the debt or liability in question; or
(4) The claimant has submitted to the succession representative a formal proof
of his claim against the succession, as provided in Article 3245 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
The provisions of this section cannot be waived impliedly through the failure
of a litigant to object to the admission of evidence which is inadmissible
thereunder.
La. R.S. 13:3721 (1968).
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is for the creditor to sue the heirs or legatees of the deceased. If Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:1421 relieves the heirs and legatees of personal liability,
it is unclear that the creditor whose claim is founded on parol evidence
(as certain medical expense claims are) has any remedy at all. 63
C. Succession Opened Judicially With Administration
Where the succession is opened judicially and there is an admin-
istration, the unsecured creditor's remedies are clear-cut: he presents his
claim to the succession representative for acknowledgement and payment
in due course," and for reasons explored later, he should file a petition
for notice as allowed by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
3305.61- If the succession representative refuses to acknowledge the debt,
the creditor may sue the succession representative immediately on the
debt," although once he obtains judgment he cannot execute against
the succession property. 67 He can, of course, then compel the represen-
tative to list his debt on the tableau. He can file a formal proof of
claim6" and can preserve and enforce the privilege granted by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:5011.69 An administration contemplates payment of
creditors; where there is an administration, unsecured creditors usually
get, paid without great difficultly. It should be noted, however, that
death acts as a three-month moratorium on payment of debts in these
circumstances, as the succession representative cannot be authorized to
pay debts until three months after the decedent's death. 70
63. The courts might hold that'filing a formal proof of claim with the Clerk of
Court complies with the statute. Likewise, the courts might hold that a suit to enforce
the privilege granted by La. R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983) satisfies the statute. It should be
noted.that the "dead man" statute is not congruent with La. R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983).
The privilege appears to be available to all creditors, even if-the claim is unliquidated
or founded on parole evidence. To give effect to the -"dead man" statute, its provisions
would have to be applicable to proceedings to enforce the privilege.
64. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3241. In Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Quad Drilling
Corp., 284 So. 2d 351, 354 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 284 So. 2d 767 (1973), the
court held that a creditor is required, to make this claim against the succession as a
condition precedent to enforcing his claim if a succession representative has been appointed.
See also Matherne v. Matherne's Estate, 341 So. 2d 1254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), writ
denied, 343 So. 2d 1072 (1977).
65. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3305.
66. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3246.
67. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3247; Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Shipp, 205 So. 2d 101
(La. App. 2d Cir.), amended and aff'd, 252 La. 745, 214 So. 2d 129 (1968).
68. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3245.
69. La. R.S. 9:5011 (1983).
70. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3302. Under the terms of the article, the succession
representative can be authorized to pay urgent debts before the end of the statutory




Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3248 expressly allows the
holder of a conventional mortgage or pledge of movable or immovable
property to enforce his rights in a separate suit outside the succession
proceedings. 71 Apparently, all other creditors, even the holder of a
judicial mortgage resulting from recordation of a final, unappealable
judgment, are deemed unsecured creditors. Thus, the creditor whose
claim is secured by a statutory lien pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:4801 to 9:4855 apparently must act as an unsecured creditor to enforce
his rights .72 There are no reported decisions on how a creditor whose
claim is secured by an assignment of accounts receivable should be
treated. 73 Once again Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 may be signif-
icant. If that statute is held to allow the heirs to absolve themselves
from personal liability for the decedent's debts by filing an inventory
or detailed descriptive list, the creditor secured by an assignment of
been authorized to continue a business of the decedent, La. Code Civ. P. art. 3224, the
succession representative may pay debts incurred by it without court approval. See comment
(b) to La. Code Civ. P. art. 3301. The three month moratorium imposed by La. Code
Civ. P. art. 3302 is designed to allow time for all creditors to file their claims before
any are paid. If the succession is insolvent, marginally solvent, or has a liquidity problem,
sound administration requires that the succession representative have all claims in hand
and rank them by priority before disbursing succession funds.
71. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3248.
72. La. R.S. 9:4801 to 4855 (1983 & Supp. 1987). The Private Works Act, 1981 La.
Acts No. 724, provides for liens in favor of contractors, subcontractors, employees and
materialmen. Their lien would not be lost by the death of the landowner, but the
enforcement of their claim appears to be governed by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
provisions for unsecured creditors. Query how a laborer could meet the requirements of
the "dead man" statute, La. R.S. 13:3721 (1968), if the heirs are placed into possession
without an administration. Since the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure is not substantive
law, and La. R.S. 9:4801 to 4855 (1983 & Supp. 1987) is substantive law, a good argument
can be made that the lien holder should be permitted to pursue his normal remedy to
enforce the lien simply by naming the succession representative, if any, or heirs and
legatees if there is none, as defendant.
73. A problem arises because La. Code Civ. P. art. 3191 gives the succession rep-
resentative full control of the property of the decedent. Presumably, however, his rights
are no greater than those of the decedent, so that if there is a valid assignment of
accounts receivable, this secured creditor may continue to receive payment on the assigned
accounts. A more difficult question arises if the creditor gives notice to the account
debtors and starts physically receiving payment only after appointment of a succession
representative. In the case of pledged property, it is clear that the pledgee is entitled to
possession against the succession representative until the debt is paid. Guaranty Bank &
Trust Co. v. Canal Land & Live Stock Co., 161 La. 253, 108 So. 472 (1926); Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Shipp, 205 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 2d Cir.), amended and aff'd, 252
La. 745, 214 So. 2d 129 (1968); Motors Sec. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 17 So. 2d 316 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1944). But again, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure expressly recognizes
the pledgee's rights; it does not mention the assignee of accounts receivable.
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receivables may have to preserve and enforce timely the lien granted by
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5011 to continue enjoying his security. 74
Such cases are likely to be rare in practice as receivables are most
commonly accepted as collateral from incorporated businesses rather
than sole proprietorships. Likewise, there are no recent decisions on
whether a bank can exercise a contractual right of offset after the death
of a customer. In any event, if the creditor is only partially secured,
he must proceed as an unsecured creditor with respect to that part of
the debt that is not secured.
CONTINGENT LIABILITIES
Unmatured and contingent liabilities present a special problem. Con-
trary to the assertion of official comment (b) to Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 3001, 71 most mortgages now make the death of
any mortgagor a default which gives the mortgagee the option of ac-
celerating the debt. Generally, it is possible for the surviving spouse
and heirs to come to an understanding with the mortgage holder without
paying the entire balance or refinancing it. The acceleration option,
however, does have a bearing on whether the succession is relatively
free of debt within the meaning of article 3001. It should be noted that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 probably does not alter the require-
ment that the succession be relatively free of debt for the heirs to be
sent into possession without an administration.
The serious problem arises if there is an unliquidated obligation,
one which is disputed and perhaps is being litigated at the time the
decedent dies. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure76 distinctly en-
visions that a succession representative will be substituted as a party in
the litigation in place of the decedent. But what is to be done in the
succession in this instance? The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure gives
little guidance.
Since the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure clearly contemplates
that the heirs will have personal liability for the decedent's debts if they
accept unconditionally, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 may be sig-
74. There are two arguments to be made. It can be argued that although the heirs
have no personal liability, the succession property is still liable for the debt, but that
liability can be enforced only by preserving and enforcing the lien pursuant to La. R.S.
9:5011 (1983). To the contrary, it can be argued that the assignment of the receivables
is a sale and the creditor is an owner of them; as such, the succession has no interest
in the assigned receivables so that the creditor need do nothing except collect his receivables.
The latter argument seems fallacious. Once the assignee's debt is paid, he has no further
interest in the receivables.
75. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3001 comment (b).
76. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 802-807 and 3196.
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nificant here. Suppose the decedent were sued for breach of contract
and, there being no succession representative appointed, the heirs them-
selves are substituted as defendants. The heirs then open the succession
judicially, file a detailed descriptive list, and are placed in possession
without an administration. Are they now entitled to be dismissed from
the breach of contract suit on the ground that they can have no personal
liability? If Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 is interpreted to mean
that the heirs avoid personal liability by filing a detailed descriptive list
in the succession proceedings, then it seems they should be dismissed
from the lawsuit.77 It would follow that the plaintiff in it would have
to comply with Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5011 to 9:5016 to preserve
his claim against the property of the decedent rather than merely con-
tinuing the litigation. 71
Even if the heirs provoke an administration, it is not clear what
the succession representative should do. In Succession of Isgitt79 the
court suspended the homologation of a tableau of distribution until the
outcome of the litigation (in which the succession representative was
substituted as defendant) was known. The court noted, however, that
the succession representative could be authorized to pay other creditors
whose claims clearly primed any judgment the litigant might procure.
This is less than a perfect answer: if there are a substantial number of
unsecured creditors of the succession 0 who will participate at parity
with the litigant if he is successful, their payment will be delayed until
completion of the lawsuit. Otherwise, the funds available to pay the
successful litigant might be exhausted before he procures judgment.
In another succession, the succession representative appeared to have
delayed payment voluntarily until contingent liabilities could be resolved.
In this instance, the court ordered the succession representative to place
the successful litigant on the tableau of distribution as a judgment
creditor with a liquidated claim. 81 These cases are notable for holding
77. La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987).
78. La. R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983). See Bologna Brothers v. Morrissey, 154 So. 2d
455 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 245 La. 56, 156 So. 2d 601 (1963), for a decision
under prior law. Because there was no indication before the court that the heirs' acceptance
was limited in any way, the court found them personally liable for the decedent's debt.
Since this was a Mississippi succession, with Mississippi heirs sued in Louisiana, the
decision is questionable as to its use of Louisiana law to determine the heirs' liability.
79. 297 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). See supra note 52 for a discussion of
this case.
80. For these purposes, holders of statutory liens such as those for funeral expenses
and expenses of the last iUness, should be considered secured creditors, as they will be
ranked ahead of unsecured creditors on the tableau of distribution.
81. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Shipp, 205 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 2d Cir.), amended
and aff'd, 252 La. 745, 214 So. 2d 129 (1968); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Shipp, 220
So. 2d 735 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 132, 222 So. 2d 883 (1969).
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that the creditor who started litigation during the decedent's lifetime is
entitled to substitute the succession representative as a party and continue
the litigation rather than being relegated to remedies of succession cred-
itors offered by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. 2
Succession representatives may not always be so accommodating.
They may proceed to administer the succession and put the heirs into
possession after the administration and payment of all liquidated cred-
itors' claims. The holder of a contingent claim, especially if it is in
litigation, then has a Succession of Isgitt83 problem. In Re Richardson's
Estate84 is a grim warning to holders of unliquidated claims of what
may happen if the succession is closed by a judgment of possession:
the court may refuse to reopen the succession.8" Possibly, if the claim
asserted deals intimately with immovable property, the court will allow
its prosecution even against a nondomiciliary succession representative
who has been discharged.8 6 But where the claim is essentially an unli-
quidated claim for money, it appears the creditor must take some step
82. Deposit Guar., 205 So. 2d 101; Commercial Credit, 220 So. 2d 735.
83. 297 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). See supra note 52.
84. 214 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 253 La. 66, 216 So. 2d 309
(1968). The litigation actually started with Molero v. Bass, 190 So. 2d 141 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966), writ denied, 250 La. 2, 193 So. 2d 523 (1967). Sid W. Richardson, a
Texas domiciliary, owned vast mineral interests in Louisiana. After his death, ancillary
succession proceedings were opened in Louisiana in the course of which the net Louisiana
estate, nearly $20,000,000, was paid in cash by the ancillary succession representative to
the Texas succession representative. Mrs. Molero alleged an assignment of mineral interests
by Richardson to her late husband and breach of that assignment. The court refused, in
both instances, to reopen the ancillary succession proceedings so that Mrs. Molero could
assert her claim against it. Finally in Molero v. Bass, 322 So. 2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975), writ denied, 325 So. 2d 609 (1976), Mrs. Molero appeared to have found some
viable defendants to sue on her claim.
85. In Succession of Nunez ex rel. First Nat'l Bank of Abbeville v. Pickett, 335 So.
2d 778 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), the succession representative was not a Louisiana
domiciliary and therefore had appointed an agent for service of process. The bank paid
over to the succession representative a bank account which belonged to a person other
than the decedent. The succession was closed by a judgment of possession which discharged
the succession representative. The agent appointed for service of process resigned. When
the bank discovered the error and sued, the court would not reopen the succession. The
problem, in part, was a perceived lack of personal jurisdiction. See also Succession of
Yancovich, 289 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) and Danos v. Waterford Oil Co.,
225 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 856, 227 So. 2d 596 (1969).
86. Middle Tenn. Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Ford, 205 So. 2d 867 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1967), further opinions on the merits of the claim asserted, 256 So. 2d
658 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), aff'd, 274 So. 2d 173 (1973). The heirs urged that a sale
made in the succession proceedings was lesionary. Although the nondomiciliary succession
representative had been discharged and the succession closed, the court allowed the suit
predicating jurisdiction over the property's location in Louisiana. Technically, this decision
can be reconciled with the decisions cited supra note 85, but this court seems to be of
a more liberal mind about allowing claims asserted after the succession is closed.
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in the succession to preserve his rights. To date, Succession of Isgitts7
is the best model for the creditor to follow. That case indicates that
the creditor with an unliquidated claim should.take action in the suc-
cession by opposing a tableau and appealing any adverse action.
NOTICE, TABLEAUS, OPPOSITIONS, AND HOMOLOGATION
A succession representative may not pay debts without prior court
approval.8 8 The succession representative typically files a petition for
authority to pay debts and annexes to it a tableau of distribution
itemizing the debts he seeks to pay. 9 The Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure allows notice by publication to bring the filing of a tableau
of distribution to the creditors' attention, 9° unless the creditor had filed
a petition for notice.9 ' The authorized procedure is dubious and may
even fail to comport with due process. 2
The efficacy of notice by publication may be doubted, and the
dispensation of personal notice is to be deplored. Important creditors'
rights depend on opposing a tableau of distribution, 9 and others are
timed by the filing of a judgment of possession.Y Interstate creditors
87. 297 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). See supra note 52.
88. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3303. A succession representative who pays creditors without
court approval is in serious trouble. He is subject to the 20% interest provision of La.
Code Civ. P. art. 3222 and other adverse action. See, e.g., Succession of Baronet, 222
La. 1051, 64 So. 2d 428 (1953); cf. Succession of Dykes, 258 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 261 La. 533, 260 So. 2d 319 (1972); Succession of Rosenthal, 369 So.
2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 371 So. 2d 1345 (1979).
89. See Succession of Taglialavore, 490 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986), for an
example where the tableau was filed and homologated without a petition for authority
filed- simultaneously. Writs were granted to deal with other issues, and the case was
affirmed at 500 So. 2d 393 (La. 1987) without discussion of this point. Note that if the
succession representative lacks funds to pay all creditors, or if the succession is insolvent,
he must carefully rank all creditors according to their lawful privileges and mortgages.
Otherwise, the tableau cannot be homologated. Succession of Kilpatrick, 422 So. 2d 483
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
90. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3304.
91. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3305. If the creditor filed such a notice, service of the
tableau on him may be accomplished by mail.
92. Compare Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S. Ct. 2706
(1983), which insisted that a valid tax sale required notice to any mortgagee whose name
and address was found in the public records. Recently, in Tulsa Professional Collection
Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 56 Law Week 4302 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held
that the notice by publication provision of Oklahoma's barclaim statute failed to comply
with due process. See also, Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 100 Nev. 337, 683 P.2d 20
(1984). The Pope decision probably means La. Code Civ. P. art. 3304 is unconstitutional.
93. See La. R.S. 9:3721 (1983).
94. The prescription for privileges under La. R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983) commences
to run with the filing of a judgment of possession. The filing of a tableau of distribution,
particularly a final. tableau, alerts the creditor that a judgment of possession may be
rendered shortly.
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domiciled in other states are now common due to the mass marketing
of credit cards. 95 It is doubtful that a credit card issuer domiciled in
New York, Massachusetts, or South Dakota will know what newspaper
serves as the official journal at the decedent's domicile in Louisiana;96
such creditors indeed may learn of the death itself quite late.97 The
creditor's only protection is to file a petition for notice, and to do so,
the creditor must learn of the death.
Since postage is not expensive, the law might reasonably require the
succession representative to mail a tableau of distribution to all creditors
and heirs by certified mail, return receipt requested. 9 Such a requirement
would miss giving notice to a creditor who had not filed a claim,9 and
it would create some aggravations in those cases in which the postal
service failed to make delivery. On the whole, however, such mailings
seem a cheaper, more effective method of giving notice to interested
parties than publication.
If the creditor is not listed on the tableau of distribution, he should
file an opposition to it.100 The opposition is tried by summary procedure,
and it is not entirely clear what relief the court may order. Under
Louisiana law, claims on open account, promissory notes, other con-
tracts, etc., ordinarily cannot be resolved by summary process but require
a trial by ordinary proceedings.' 0' There are some old cases which indicate
95. The mass marketing of credit cards is a phenomenon which developed subsequent
to the adoption of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. At the time of its adoption,
interstate creditors were quite uncommon and that circumstance may have influenced the
notice by publication provisions. In addition to interstate creditors created by credit cards,
numerous home mortgages are now held by interstate creditors.
96. Such knowledge is necessary for the creditor to know which newspaper he should
search for notice. Are such limited circulation newspapers as the Denham Springs News,
the sometimes official journal of Livingston Parish, even available in distant states?
Metropolitan newspapers present another problem. Even if it is known that the notice is
there, it can be a serious chore to find notice of filing of a tableau of distribution in
the legal advertisement section of the newspaper in a major metropolitan area.
97. If, for instance, the surviving spouse has always written the check to pay the
credit card installment due and makes post mortem payments, there is nothing to alert
the creditor of the death until payments cease.
98. Such a procedure is required in the case of a bulk sales transaction. See La.
R.S. 9:2962 (1983 & Supp. 1987). The Bulk Sale Law does not apply to sales by succession
representatives. La. R.S. 9:2965 (1983).
99. The soundest argument for requiring a publication of the notice is the possibility
that it will come to the attention of a creditor not known to the succession representative.
100. Particularly if the claim is founded on parole evidence, the creditor should do
so. See La. R.S. 13:3721 (1968).
101. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2592 sets out the authority to use summary process. An
opposition to a tableau of distribution is expressly included. Yet in the case of disputed
debts, as in the Succession of Isgitt, 297 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), approach,
requiring a separate suit by ordinary process on disputed debts seems sounder. Note also
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that on trial of the opposition, the creditor must make out his claim,
and that the court can order it placed on the tableau0 2 ; as we shall
see, there are also decisions that the homologation of a tableau of
distribution is res judicata as to the validity and amount of the debts
shown on it. In practice, some courts are willing to order a succession
representative to place the objecting creditor on the tableau once the
creditor presents a prima facie case. If the debt is disputed, however,
it seems sounder to refuse to homologate the tableau; rather the creditor
should be required to sue the succession representative by ordinary
process.' 03 If there is no dispute and the debt was merely overlooked,
the succession representative ordinarily will amend the tableau to include
it upon receipt of the opposition. The court reached essentially these
conclusions in Succession of Griffith.14
It must be kept in mind that not all oppositions to a tableau will
be filed by creditors whose claims are not listed. Frequently, the heirs
or surviving spouse will file an opposition to a creditor's claim that is
listed. What the court is willing to do after a hearing on the opposition
may depend on whether a creditor or an heir or surviving spouse files
the opposition. On an opposition by a surviving spouse or heir, the
court may order the challenged creditor's claim removed from the tab-
leau1 05 In Succession of Rosenthal,'06 the court appears to have adju-
dicated the merits of an alleged creditor's claims which were asserted
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Shipp, 220 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 254
La. 132, 222 So. 2d 883 (1969), and Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Shipp, 205 So. 2d 101
(La. App. 2d Cir. ), amended and aff'd, 252 La. 745, 214 So. 2d 129 (1968), both
holding that a creditor who had started litigation with the decedent could not be forced
into summary proceedings in the succession after his death.
102. See, e.g., Succession of Gayle, 27 La. Ann. 547 (1875); Succession of Kerley,
18 La. Ann. 583 (1866); Pargoud v. Griffing, 10 La. 358 (1836). Of more recent vintage,
in Matter of Successions of Freeman, 322 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
325 So. 2d 277 (1975), the merits of a claim not included on a tableau appear to have
been decided in some sort of summary proceeding. In Landry v. Weber, 345 So. 2d 11
(La. 1977), however, the succession representative rejected a claim, and the creditor sued
the succession representative. This procedure is expressly contemplated by the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, and the merits of the claim were determined after trial by
ordinary process.
103. The danger in litigating the merits of creditors' claims by summary process is
the risk that sufficient time for discovery will not be permitted in a summary proceeding.
Frequently, the heirs are more likely to be prejudiced thereby than creditors.
104. 415 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982). The rather frantic efforts of the creditor
to collect in this case are strong reasons for strict adherence to the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure and for the soundness of the result reached in the opinion cited.
105. See, e.g., In re Prejean, 234 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970). The court of
appeal restored the creditor's claim to the tableau. The decision seems apt, as the claim
arose during the administration of the succession.
106. 369 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 371 So. 2d 1345 (1979).
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by the succession representative in her individual capacity at the summary
hearing on the heir's opposition to the tableau. The court's action seems
logical, given the intimate relationship of the parties to the succession,
but in the instance of a third party creditor there might be merit in
denying homologation and relegating the parties to litigation by ordinary
process.
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, however, clearly contem-
plates litigation by summary process in this instance. If the creditor files
a claim under article 3241107 and it is acknowledged by the succession
representative, or if the succession representative places the claim on
the tableau, 08 under article 3243'09 there is a prima facie presumption
of the validity of the creditor's claim. The comment points out that
article 3243 overrules the doctrine of In re Romero,"0 under which the
creditor had to prove his claim, even if included on the tableau, when
the heirs filed an opposition to the -tableau. Under article 3243, the
heirs have the rather daunting prospect of carrying the burden of proof
to disclaim the debt in a summary proceeding."' The innovations in
article 3243 reflect the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure principle that
resolution of disputes, by litigation if necessary, should be the decision
of the succession representative. As long as the succession representative
acts strictly as a fiduciary, this approach has merit. It provokes skep-
ticism, however, where the succession representative has a conflict of
interest and seeks payment to himself.
If the succession is doubtfully solvent, or insolvent, a creditor may
become seriously concerned about claims filed by other creditors. The
claims most likely to attract suspicion are those of "insider creditors,"
that is, creditor claims by heirs or the surviving spouse. The accounting
and reimbursement concepts in the current law on matrimonial regimes" 2
make it increasingly likely that the surviving spouse will have claims to
107. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3241.
108. Succession of Richmond, 35 La. Ann. 858 (1883).
109. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3243.
110. 38 La. Ann. 947 (1886).
111. In Succession of Martin, 335 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 337
So. 2d 516 (1976), the court considered La. Code Civ. P. art. 3244 on burden of proof.
This Article of the Code of Civil Procedure is directly applicable to the situation
in this litigation. The two claims in dispute were included in the executrix's
petition for authority to pay debts. The claims are prima facie presumed to be
valid and the burden of proving the invalidity of the claims was on opponent-
appellant.
Id. at 497. On the major dispute, the opponent failed to carry this burden of proof.
112. La. Civ. Code arts. 2358, 2369.
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.make against the succession. I" 3 Succession of Hoffpauir 4 stands for two
important propositions: (a) where the succession is under administration,
the surviving spouse has no cause of action against the heirs for ac-
counting and reimbursement claims, as the cause of action is against.
the succession; and (b) such claims are properly presented by the suc-
cession representative in the tableau of distribution.
The court's reasoning can hardly be faulted, but the facts of Suc-
cession of Hoffpauir portend a possibly serious problem. In that instance,
the surviving spouse (decedent's second wife) was the succession rep-
resentative, and the opposition was entered by the heirs (children of
decedent's first marriage). If the surviving spouse is the succession
representative, can the surviving spouse by complying with Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 3241, or by placing the spousal claims
on the tableau, obtain the prima facie presumption of validity against
all other persons?" 5 Can a creditor oppose such a claim? One old case," 6
which seems sound, held that a creditor could not oppose other creditors'
claims where the succession was thoroughly solvent. By implication, the
creditor can file such an opposition if the succession is insolvent or
dubiously solvent, and, presumably, a creditor would be motivated to
file an opposition only in such circumstances. Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 3243 still appears to leave the creditor with an insur-
mountable burden of proof to make the opposition succeed." 7
If the claims of the surviving spouse threaten to exhaust the assets
available to pay third-party creditors,"' the protection of third party
113. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3098 makes it likely that the surviving spouse, if any, will
be the succession representative.
114. 411 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
115. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3243 seems to have that effect. In Succession of Smith,
232 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) the surviving spouse/succession representative
proposed several payments to herself. Heirs filed an opposition. The court rejected most
of the proposed payments to the surviving spouse/succession representative without any
discussion of La. Code Civ. P. art. 3243 or burden of proof. The opinion reads as if
the court considered that the surviving spouse/succession representative had the burden
of proving the validity of her claims. That allocation of the burden of proof appears to
be contrary to La. Code Civ. P. art. 3243, but the appearance of self-dealing by a
fiduciary in this sort of case favors the result reached.
116. Succession of Gohs, 37 La. Ann. 428 (1885). If there are sufficient funds to pay
the objecting creditor, it is none of his business who else gets paid.
117. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3243.
118. What rank as a creditor does a surviving spouse attain? Apparently, a surviving
spouse is an unsecured creditor to share pro rata with other unsecured creditors. Before
the 1980 legislation on matrimonial regimes, however, there was a substantial body of
decisions which held that the spouses' interest in the community, on its termination, was
residual and that community creditors were entitled to be paid before there was any
distribution to the spouses. In Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 La. 603, 617, 50 So. 2d 208,
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creditors from imposition" 9 seems to require some caution on the part
212 (1950), the court stated: "But neither the spouses nor the heirs have anything to
claim out of the acquets and gains 'until all debts are paid or liquidated."' See also
Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932); Harmon & Stringfellow v. Legrande,
151 La. 253, 91 So. 726 (1922); Latour v. Latour, 134 La. 342, 64 So. 133 (1914); Kelly
v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913); Succession of.Landry, 128 La. 333, 54 So.
870 (1911); Miguez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 176, 51 So. 108 (1910); Succession of Emonot,
109 La. 359, 33 So. 368 (1902); Childs v. Lockett, 107 La. 270, 31 So. 751 (1902);
Messick v. Mayer, 52 La. Ann. 1161, 27 So. 815 (1900); Succession of Fernandez, 50
La. Ann. 564, 23 So. 457 (1898); Berthelot v. Fitch, 45 La. Ann. 346, 12 So. 625 (1893);
Bartoli v. Huguenard, 39 La. Ann. 411, 2 So. 196 (1887); Dickson v. Dickson, 36 La.
Ann. 453 (1884); Durham v. Williams, 32 La. Ann. 968 (1880); Cestac v. Florane, 31
La. Ann. 493 (1879); Riley v. Condran, 26 La. Ann. 294 (1874); Ricker v. Pearson, 26
La. Ann. 391 (1874); Phelan v. Ax, 25 La. Ann. 379 (1873); Sadler v. Kimbrough, 24
La. Ann. 534 (1872); Baird v. Lemee, 23 La. Ann. 424 (1871); Ware v. Jones, 19 La.
Ann. 428 (1867); Succession of Kerley, 18 La. Ann. 483 (1866); Depas v. Riez, 2 La.
Ann. 30 (1847); Succession of Ogden, 10 Rob. 457 (La. 1845); Succession of Thomas,
12 Rob. 215 (La. 1845); Hart v. Foley, 1 Rob. 378 (La. 1842); Lawson v. Ripley, 17
La. 238 (1841); German v. Gay, 9 La. 580 (1836); Succession of Lewis, 12 So. 2d 7 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1943). Further, prior to the 1980 legislation on matrimonial regimes,
community creditors enjoyed a priority over separate creditors with respect to community
property. Thus, in Zeigler v. His Creditors, 49 La. Ann. 144, 174, 21 So. 666, 678 (1896),
the court stated:
It has been repeatedly held that community creditors are entitled to a priority
on community property over the separate creditors of the spouses. This preference
is secured neither by a privilege nor a mortgage, technically, but is the result
of the tenure or character of the interest of the spouses in the property. It is
analogous to the right to the preference of the partnership creditors over the
creditors of the individual partners.
See also Succession of Keppel, 113 La. 246, 36 So. 955 (1904); Thompson v. Vance, 110
La. 26, 34 So. 112 (1903); Pior v. Giddens, 50 La. Ann. 216, 23 So. 337 (1897); Healey
v. Ashbey, 47 La. Ann. 636, 17 So. 195 (1895); Newman v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485,
16 So. 481 (1894); Rawlins v. Giddens, 46 La. Ann. 1136, 15 So. 501 (1894); Webre v.
Lorio, 42 La. Ann. 178, 7 So. 460 (1890); Landreneau v. Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 154 So. 2d 769 (1963). These concepts, however, may not
have survived the 1980 legislation on matrimonial regimes.
119. Third party creditors are likely to have no knowledge of the facts underlying the
claims of the surviving spouse. Indeed, they have substantial difficulty in learning such
facts even by discovery techniques during litigation. Since an accounting claim can only
be brought at the termination of the community, the underlying facts may have occurred
years before, and the testimony of the surviving spouse may be the only available evidence.
In such circumstances, it seems quite dubious to allow the surviving spouse to obtain a
prima facie presumption of validity under La. Code Civ. P. art. 3243. Succession of
Smith, 323 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), appears not to have utilized article 3243
and to have imposed the burden of proof on the spouse. Compare Guitreau v. Kinchen,
361 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978). The decedent lived with the plaintiff family
for the last seven years of his life, and Mrs. Guitreau acted as companion, cook, secretary,
bookkeeper, and chauffeur to him. After his death, the plaintiff family sued on certain
bearer promissory notes. The court refused to allow recovery. If the opinion was a decision
on the law of bills and notes, it is wrong: consideration for a note is presumed. The
CREDITORS OF SUCCESSIONS
of the courts in accepting such claims. A succession representative is a
fiduciary. 20 It is very doubtful whether a serious creditor of a succession
of questionable solvency should or even lawfully can act as its fiduci-
ary.12' Where the claims of the surviving spouse threaten the ultimate
payment of third-party creditors, the assertion of these claims (no matter
how valid they are) may be a breach of the fiduciary duty on the part
of the succession representative to champion, unswervingly, the rights
of his principals. Certainly the surviving spouse who acts as succession
representative in these circumstances has a serious conflict of interest.
In such instances, it seems dubious to allow the surviving spouse, in
the capacity of succession representative, to obtain a prima facie pre-
sumption of validity of the spousal claims merely by listing the spousal
claims on the tableau of distribution. 22
The law on this subject could be clarified in several ways. A clear
determination that spousal claims are subordinate to or that such claims
are on a parity with third-party creditors would allow third party cred-
itors to know if spousal claims were a threat to ultimate payment. If
spousal claims are to be on a parity with third-party unsecured creditors,
it would be useful to have legislation addressing the special problems
of proving or disproving the validity of such claims.
plaintiff clearly had no obligation to prove the extent of consideration by offering evidence
of the value of the services rendered, because the consideration simply does not have to
be equivalent to the face amount of a note, But the opinion probably is not a decision
on the law of bills and notes. Rather, it is an example of judicial skepticism about
succession creditors' claims presented by insiders.
120. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3191.
121. Succession of Robinson, 393 So. 2d 268 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), illustrates an
analogous problem. As a product of matrimonial litigation, the decedent wife obtained
a money judgment against her spouse. She died before the judgment became executory.
The judgment debtor, her husband, promptly had himself appointed administrator of the
succession. On application of the decedent's mother, the court removed him as succession
representative on the stated ground that it was misadministration of succession assets for
him to use his divorce court lawyer to file pleadings in the succession! Surely, the stated
ground is a fiction; the real problem is that the principal debtor of a succession should
not act as its fiduciary. Succession of Elrod, 362 So. 2d 1191 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
granted, 371 So. 2d 796 (1978) (remanded without decision on the merits; held that a
succession representative could not make adverse claims against the heirs or the succession).
If this decision is good law, a surviving spouse with serious accounting or reimbursement
claims cannot lawfully act as succession representative without waiving those claims. But
La. Code Civ. P. art. 3098 expressly contemplates and authorizes a creditor of the decedent
to act as succession representative. However much Succession of Elrod may comport with
the general law of fiduciaries, the result seems contrary to the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure.
122. Although accounting claims are not exigible by a spouse until termination of the
community, they may be based on facts which occurred years before. Nobody but the
surviving spouse and the decedent may have any personal knowledge of these facts. These
circumstances suggest the need for special legislation dealing with proof of spousal claims.
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If there is no opposition to a filed tableau of distribution, or possibly
after a hearing on an opposition, the court will render a judgment
homologating the tableau. Such a judgment may be more than just a
grant of permission to the succession representative to pay claims. Under
some old cases, the judgment of homologation is equivalent to an in
personam judgment, so that if the succession representative does not
pay the claims on the tableau homologated, any creditor listed on the
tableau can obtain a writ of fieri facias and execute on the judgment. 23
Futhermore, the judgment of homologation is res judicata as to the
validity and amount of the debts listed on the tableau. 24 If these old
cases are still good law after the adoption of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure, and they may be, they are a salutary warning to creditors
to keep abreast of succession proceedings and to timely file an opposition
to the tableau when necessary. 125 The point is worth emphasis because
it seems to be the practice in some courts to file such oppositions to
the final account rather than to the tableau of distribution. 26 In such
cases, if challenged, the opposing creditor may find the judgment of
homologation makes the figure given in the tableau res judicata. 27
123. See, e.g., Lobit v. Castille, 14 La. Ann. 779 (1859); Ray v. Tatum, 23 La. Ann.
592 (1871). There are decisions to the contrary, however.
124. See State ex. rel. Ernest Realty Co. v. Moore, Blane & Merklein, 183 La. 927,
165 So. 147 (1936); Succession of Rabasse, 50 La. Ann. 746, 23 So. 910 (1898); Succession
of Conrad, 45 La. Ann. 89, 11 So. 935 (1893); Durham v. Williams, 32 La. Ann. 968
(1880); Succession of Egana, 18 La. Ann. 263 (1866); Milne Asylum v. Female Orphan
Soc'y, 7 La. Ann. 19 (1852); Succession of Peytavin, 10 Rob. 118 (La. 1845).
125. Such cases add extra weight to the significance of notice to creditors.
126. Succession of Smith, 232 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), for example, is
a case in which the opponent waited until an account had been filed and then opposed
the account. The opinion has no discussion of any tableau of distribution.
127. Logically, an opposition to a final account should deal with matters such as
mathematical errors or claims that the succession representative did not in fact pay the
sums stated in the final account. Where the succession representative has paid according
to a duly homologated tableau of distribution, it seems that the judgment of homologation
should protect the succession representative and his bond, so that the validity of such
payments could not be challenged by opposition to the final account because the succession
representative has paid according to an order of the court. Contra Succession of Irving,
436 So. 2d 1263 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 442 So. 2d 452 (1983). In Irving, a
succession representative petitioned the court for authority to sell a succession asset to
his niece. No opposition was filed, and in due course the sale was concluded. Later, after
an unopposed petition for authority, the succession representative sold another succession
asset to a relative. Several years later, on suit of heirs, the succession representative was
held personally liable for the difference between the alleged "true value" of the assets
and their court approved sale prices. It is not clear from the opinion whether the succession
representative made the argument that the court order authorizing the sale protected him.
It certainly seems it should have; if the heirs felt the price was unsatisfactory, they should
have opposed the petition for authority to sell. Likewise, it seems that a homologated
tableau of distribution should protect the succession representative against belated claims
that the debt was not owed. But Irving does cast doubt on these propositions.
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DEPOSITARIES AFTER LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 9:1421
In common law jurisdictions, there is a problem which universal
succession avoids in Louisiana. Because of the common law rule that
personal property does not descend to the next of kin, a depositary
such as a bank runs serious risks if it transfers the deposit to the
successors or anybody other than the succession representative. If a
creditor provokes an administration after a depositary makes the transer,
the depositary may have to pay again to the succession representative. 121
Because Louisiana implements universal succession, the theoretical prob-
lem of the common law does not arise. It has always been felt that
judgments of possession and special statutes satisfactorily protected de-
positaries in Louisiana probate procedure. 129
These plausible propositions have not been rigorously tested by
litigation in recent years. There is authority, prior to the adoption of
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, that a judgment of possession
protects a depositary bank against claims of the heirs.130 More recently,
in Williams v. Bank of Louisiana in New Orleans,' the court glossed
the statute by holding that the special statute'3 2 afforded the bank no
protection where the decedent did not in fact own the account.' Two
later cases considered the bank to be protected by the various statutes
applicable in the circumstances of those cases. 3 4
128. See the hypothetical discussed by P. Haskell, Preface to Wills, Trusts and Ad-
ministration 165-66 (1987). The transfer agent for corporate stock could encounter the
same problem.
129. See Miller, Judgments of Possession, 35 Tul. L. Rev. 567 (1961). For a special
statute, see La. R.S. 6:325 (1986).
130. See Succession of Fachan, 170 La. 333, 154 So. 15 (1934), in which the bank
transferred the funds to the surviving spouse in reliance on a judgment of possession.
The bank was not liable to the heirs even though the funds were not community property.
See also Dixon v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 13 La. App. 204, 127 So. 428 (1930). The
bank was not liable to heirs not named in the judgment of possession.
131. 454 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 611 (1984).
132. Former La. R.S. 6:66 (1950), now replaced by La. R.S. 6:325 (1986).
133. The bank had paid pursuant to a judgment of possession. The decedent did not
own the account; it was owned by another person with a similar name. The bank was
held liable for conversion.
134. In Thorn v. Whitney Nat'l Bank of New Orleans, 326 So. 2d 606 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1976), a succession representative sought possession of a savings account, but
one of decedent's relatives had possession of the passbook.' The bank refused to surrender
the funds without the passbook. The court ordered the bank to deliver the funds, without
the passbook, to the succession representative on the theory that former La. R.S. 6:66
(1950) (now La. R.S. 6:325 (1986)) protected the bank absolutely. In Succession of
Prutzman, 209 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), the heirs recognized in the judgment
of possession were all minors. The bank demanded that a .tutor be appointed for the
minors and give a receipt for the contents of a bank box. Since the surviving spouse was
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It is important to note that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 3062 makes the judgment of possession prima facie, but not
conclusive, proof of the relationship of the deceased to the persons
named in it and of their right to possession of the estate. 3 ' In Quiett
v. Estate of Moore,13 6 the court stated:
A judgment of possession is prima facie evidence of the right
of the heirs in whose favor it was rendered to take possession
of the decedent's estate; however, it is not a basis for a plea
of res judicata or conclusive evidence against persons having an
adverse interest in or claim against the estate, such as heirs or
creditors of the estate.
Succession of Feist'17 is a dramatic case. Mr. and Mrs. Feist were killed
in an automobile accident. A life insurance policy on Mr. Feist named
Mrs. Feist as the beneficiary. Mrs. Feist's mother had herself placed in
possession of her daughter's estate and collected the insurance proceeds
from the insurer. Thereafter, the collateral heirs of Mr. Feist sued and
the lower court, in a summary proceeding, annulled the judgment of
possession in part and ordered the insurer to pay the policy proceeds
and penalties to the succession of Mr. Feist. 3 The court of appeal
affirmed, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed without discussing
the effect of the insurer's payment in reliance on a judgment of pos-
session. 3 9 The court of appeal felt that Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure article 3062 did not protect the insurer.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 may reawaken creditor interest in
the conclusiveness of judgments of possession.' 40 If the heirs utilize this
statute to gain immediate possession of the estate, while repudiating
liability for debts, a creditor may be tempted to pursue a depositary
who has delivered a substantial bank account to the heirs. The quoted
language in Quiett seems to raise that possibility. In addition, if the
recognized as usufructuary in the judgment of possession, the court felt that La. Code
Civ. P. art. 3062 adequately protected the bank and ordered it to deliver the contents
to the surviving spouse.
135. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3062. Quiett v. Estate of Moore, 378 So. 2d 362, (La.
1979); see also Succession of Feist, 274 So. 2d 806 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 287 So. 2d 514 (1973).
136. 378 So. 2d 362, 367 (La. 1979).
137. 274 So. 2d 806 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd in part, 287 So. 2d 514 (1973).
138. The case presented the problem of correlating the comorientes provisions of then
La. Civ. Code art. 939 and the seemingly conflicting La. R.S. 22:645 (1978). Under one
statute, Mrs. Feist was deemed the survivor of Mr. Feist; under the other, Mr. Feist was
deemed the survivor.
139. The Louisiana Supreme Court decision turned on the proper coordination of the
seemingly conflicting statutes referred to in the preceding note.
140. La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987).
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depositary pays over the account within three months of death, the
privilege granted by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5011 may offer further
support to the creditor's argument.
CREDITORS' RIGHTS AFTER LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 9:1421
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 seriously prejudices creditors rights
if it is held to mean that heirs may obtain possession of and dispose
of the decedent's assets, without administration, and avoid personal
liability to creditors merely by filing a detailed descriptive list or inventory
in succession proceedings.' 41 It will make Louisiana probate law unique
in the nation in an unpleasant manner. In all other states, an admin-
istration of the decedent's estate, and the payment of creditors in the
administration, is a condition precedent to the heirs obtaining possession
of the assets. Heretofore, Louisiana was able to use a more expeditious,
less expensive procedure by implementing principles of universal suc-
cession: the heirs could obtain possession of the assets without an
administration, but at the price of personal liability for the decedent's
debts. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 appears to make it possible
for the heirs to obtain possession of the assets, even dispose of them,
without suffering either an administration of the succession or personal
liability for the decedent's debts.
The remedies available to succession creditors after Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:1421 may be cold comfort to them. It is possible that the
statute saps Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3007142 of all
vitality so that the creditor cannot demand security because the heirs
have no personal liability for the debt. In such event, the unsecured
creditor is relegated to the privileges created by Louisiana Revised Satutes
9:5011 to 9:5016 (1983).143 Use of the privilege requires the creditor to
know the date of decedent's death and take proper procedural steps
within three months of the death. The efficacy of the privilege, once
it is properly preserved, largely depends on whether it primes prior
mortgages. Louisiana Civil Code article 3186'" seems to grant the priv-
ilege such priority, but Home Savings & Loan Association v. Tri-Parish
Ventures, Ltd. No.1145 casts serious doubt on it. That case holds that
a vendor's privilege on immovable property has priority only from the
141. La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987).
142. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3007.
143. La. R.S. 9:5011 to 5016 (1983).
144. La. Civ. Code art. 3186.
145. 505 So. 2d 165 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
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date of its recordation and is junior to prior recorded mortgages.'"6
Thus, the brave new world of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421 casts
creditors into legal limbo by forcing them to resort to a body of law
which has never received an authoritative interpretation from the courts
and where the nature and extent of their remedies is unclear.
If all other remedies fail him, a creditor may have to resort to an
attempt to annul a judgment of possession for fraud or ill practices
under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2004.147 In Succession
of Anderson, 148 the court preferred this approach to reopening a suc-
cession under article 3393. The heirs had waived a final tableau of
distribution and final account in order to be put into possession. The
court felt that this, under the facts of the case, 149 authorized the objecting
creditor to amend his pleadings to seek nullity of the judgment of
possession under article 2004. It remains to be seen how many succession
creditors can find facts which would authorize an action for nullity of
judgment where the heirs are placed in possession without an admin-
istration on their ex parte petition. 150
Under the terms of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421, the filing of
a detailed descriptive list or inventory appears to have the practical
effect of a post mortem discharge in bankruptcy:' 5' the secured creditors
can enforce their security (if they have a mortgage or pledge) but not
personal liability; unsecured creditors may, if they timely learn of the
death and jump through all the procedural hoops, divide the rest of
the non-exempt assets but without personal liability of the successors.
146. The cited case turned in part on the language creating the privilege in favor of
a homestead association. However, the court seemed convinced that "first in time, first
in right" is the rule in Louisiana to determine priority between a privilege and a mortgage.
In that respect the decision is in conflict with Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Succession
of Brooks, 180 So. 170 (La. App. Orl. 1938) and Succession of Hardy, 122 So. 154 (La.
App. Orl. 1929), both of which held that privileges for funeral charges prime pre-existing
mortgages.
147. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2004.
148. 323 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
149. The essence of the problem lay in the detailed descriptive list. The plaintiff was
a community creditor; the detailed descriptive list presented an assetless community and
a separate estate of some magnitude. The objecting creditor claimed that many of the
allegedly "separate" assets in reality belonged to the community and that the surviving
spouse/succession representative had misled him into believing he would be paid without
intervening in the succession proceedings. Current matrimonial regimes legislation avoids
this problem, as the spouse who incurs the debt is always liable personally for it.
150. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3007 was undoubtedly devised to make it unnecessary for
an objecting creditor to resort to a nullity of judgment action in these circumstances.
But, as previously noted, La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987) may undercut the effectiveness
of La. Code Civ. P. art. 3007 by absolving the heirs from personal liability.
151. La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1987).
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When the bland notice provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure are also taken into account, the fairness and wisdom of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:1421 must be doubted.
Will lenders be willing to extend credit to senior citizens or to
workmen whose occupations involve high mortality risk? Will interstate
creditors be willing to extend credit to Louisiana citizens once they
become aware of the radical change Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421
makes in Louisiana law? If creditors are still able to force' an admin-
istration after Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421, is it as desirable that
successions which formerly would have been disposed of by a simple
acceptance are now forced into an administration? If it is desirable,
should not our law be revised to require an administration for the
protection of creditors in all instances? Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421
provokes questions about policy as well as questions about the state of
the law.
CONCLUSION
Universal succession is highly desirable as it allows efficient pro-
tection of creditors while simultaneously allowing quick, inexpensive
probate proceedings. Louisiana should preserve universal succession.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1421, which obscures the consequences of
universal succession, is to be regretted and is a fit candidate for repeal.
The problems posed by that statute are unresolved, and they do not
offer any easy solution. The Louisiana Law Institute is presently working
on a revision of the Louisiana Civil Code sections on successions.
Hopefully, the revision will resolve the problems created by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:1421 and will make it crystal clear that only an
administration and payment of creditors relieves the heirs of personal
liability for the debts of the decedent. 15 2
152. It also may be hoped that if the revised articles make significant changes in the
substantive law, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure will be revised to implement the
substantive law. As originally adopted, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure was well
designed to implement the substantive law of that date. There have been changes in the
substantive law of successions (such as the rights of illegitimates) since then, and the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure has not always been updated to assure that it properly
implements current substantive law.
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